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The Virginia "Stay Law"
Section 8-31 of the Virginia Code of 1950 which pertains
to the suspension of statutes of limitations by death reads as
follows:
The period of one year from the death of any party shall
be excluded from the computation of time within which, by
the operation of any statute or rule of law, it may be neces-
sary to commence any proceeding to preserve or prevent
the loss of any right or remedy. (Emphasis added)
The ambiguity concerning the words "any party" has been
partially resolved by an extremely strict interpretation on the
part of the Supreme Court of Appeals.' The old "Stay Law'
which was passed on March 3, 1866 was even more comprehen-
sive than the present statute.2 However, there were two amend-
ments to the "Stay Law," the first of which contained the follow-
ing provision: "... the period of one year from the qualification
of a personal representative."3 (Emphasis added) Although this
wording was subsequently deleted, it nevertheless furnished the
straw for which the Court grasped in order to limit the present
statute to personal actions alone. The 'second amendment struck
the words of the foregoing provision and substituted in its
place ". . . the period of one year from the death of any
party... "4 But in the case of Steffey v. Kings it was flatly stated
thab the statute did not apply to real actions. The first amend-
ment was to carry decisive weight even though it had been
wiped off the books. In the case of Virginia Mining and Improve-
ment Co. v. HooverO it was held that the original 'Stay Law"
applied to actions of ejectment; therefore it was arguable in the
subsequent case of Steffey v. King, supra, that in substituting the
present phraseology "any party" for 'personal representative"
the General Assembly meant that Section 8-31 apply to real
actions as well. The Court, however, held that the first amend-
1 Wiliams v. Dean, 144 Va. 831, 84S, 131 S.E. 1, 5 (1935): '... the construction
which this statute should receive today is that . .. which was proper when it was
first written. It has not been changed by the fact that some of the older provisions
... have since been eliminated."
tFor an historical discussion, see Johnson v. Gills, 27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 587, 595 (1876).
'Va. Acts 1887-8, p. 345, Va. Code §2919 (1904).
Va. Acts 1895-6, p. 331. Va. Code §2919 (1904). Emphasis added.
p126 Va. 120, 101 S.E. 62 (1919).
682 Va. 449, 4 S.E. 689 (1886).
ment "... . must have been intended to apply only to personal
actions.... The parties to ejectment suits are often numerous,
and such a construction of the statute as here contended for
might result in great inconvenience."7
Inconvenience has resulted, but in most cases it has been
at the expense of the party attempting to avail himself of the
statute. On the one hand a party should not be allowed to slum-
ber forever on his rights, but in turn one should be able to rely
reasonably on this statutory provision. According to the decision
in Boggs v. Fatherly,8 "the object to be attained in excluding a
year (under the statute) . . . is to give the personal representa-
tive of... a party the benefit of a year in which to acquaint him-
self with the claims for and against the estate, and to give the
creditors of the estate a corresponding extension of time."9 Thus,
in Virginia, the one year extension applies to actions for or
against a party,10 with the qualification that the right must have
existed or at least have been capable of coming into existence
during the life of a party having a right and cause of action."
TIrough the use of the phrase "personal actions" it has been de-
termined that Code Section 8-31 does not apply to suits to en-
force liens on land,12 or to the death of a trustee in a deed of
trust who also would not fit the description of "any party" since
he ". . . has no right or remedy to lose or preserve within the
meaning of this section."' 3 The net result is that in only two
cases, both involving personal acti6ns,14 has the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals applied this one year extension provi-
sion. Obviously there is no way of knowing how often attorneys
have resorted to this statute in lower courts, but its nebulous
7 126 Va. 120, 128, 101 S.E. 62, 64 (1919).
177 Va. 259, 13 S.E.2d 298 (1941).
Id. at 264, 13 S.E.2d 298, 300.
10In most jurisdictions, even in the absence of "stay laws statutes of limitations willnot begin to run until administration is taken out on a decedent's estate or his
executor has qualified. However, statutes have been required in most jur~isdictionsto allow causes of action to lie against estates of deceased persons as the general
rule is that statutes of limitations apply to them as though they were alive. See 54
C.J.S., Death of Person Entitled to Sue §243, Death of Person Liable to Suit
§246 (1948).
1Steffey v King, 126 Va. 120, 128. 101 S.E. 62, 64 (1919); Boggs v. Fatherly. 177
Va. 239,265, 13 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1941).
1s Boggs v. .Fatherl, 177 Va. 259, 13 S.E.2d 298 (1941).
'o Id. at 265,13t S. E.2d 298, t301.Thesreasonegiventbysthe Court was that such a trustee
14 Harper v. Harper, 159 Va. 210, 169 S.E. 490 (1932) involving a creditor's suit
against an administrator, and Archer v. National Bank of Fairfax, 194 Va. 641,
74 S.E.2d 153 (1953) iin which the three year statute was extended to four years in
a cause of action to recover for services rendered decedent who had made plaintiff
an oral promise to make a will in her favor.
text undoubtedly has caused headaches even in personal
actions. 15
When statutes of this type have been enacted in other juris-
dictions, the usual phraseology has been: "... . a person entitled
to bring or liable to any action...1 6 (Emphasis added) Query,
whether Virginia's statute has been rendered virtually the same
through an interpretation of the Steffey case which held "any
party" to mean a party having a right and cause of action? Put-
ting aside any semantic comparison between having and entitled
to, we may note that a North Carolina case held the latter phrase
indicated a suspension of the statute not only as to the personal
representative, but also as to the heirs.17
An additional problem as to the applicability of these exten-
sion statutes involves partnership actions. The general rule is
that statutes limiting the time within which particular actions
must be brought apply to actions for or against the surviving part-
ners or the personal representative of a deceased Partner.l8
There is no Virginia authority on this point, but it is submitted
that Section 8-31 should apply in actions on behalf of or against
surviving partners as a natural result of the prior interpretation
given it by the Court of Appeals.
Aside from the restriction of the statute to personal actions
and the ambiguity of the words "any party," it seems possible for
Section 8-31 to have far-reaching effect, for example, in part-
nership cases. Yet there seems to be scant reason to have such
a statute where the deceased dies in the early part of the statu-
tory period. Virginia has partially remedied this problem by a
statute that restricts the time in which actions involving awards
and contracts (not unliquidated claims) can be brought against
the decedents estate. In such cases the action cannot continue
'i E.g., Was the cause of action "capable of coming into existence during the life of
the party"?1SAnn. Laws of Mass. §260-10 (1953). Likewise as to "entitled to bring," see N.C.
Gen.Stat. §1-22 (1943)- Ii Rev Stat. §83-10 (1953) as to real actions and §83-20
as to personal ones; and S.C. Code §10-107 (1950).
17 Woodlief v. Bragg. 108 N.C. 571, 13 S.E. 211 (1891).
isBennett v. Bennett. 91 Me. 80, 42 A. 237 (1898); Irwin v. Harris,, 182 N. C. 656.109 S.E. 871 (1921); McMahon v. Brown, 219 Mass. 23, 106 N.E. 576 (1914).See 54 C.J.S., Death of Person Entitled to Sue §243, Death of Person Liable to
Suit §246 (1948).
longer than five years from the qualification of the personal repre-
sentative.19 Further, in death by wrongful act cases where the
statute involved creates both the right and the .remedy it has
been held that Section 8-31 does not apply to extend the original
limitation beyond twelve months since this time limit involves
a special act of legislative grace not found in the general statutes
of limitation.20
In light of the modem trend to abolish some of the 'magic"
features which have heretofore distinguished realty from per-
sonalty it would seem advisable that Section 8-31 be extended
to actions involving realty. It would nevertheless seem advisable
to provide that in no case should a cause of action involving
realty continue longer than five years after the death of the de-
cedent.21 In this way real actions would further be brought in
line with personal ones since actions involving awards and con-
tracts already have a similar five year maximum limit. Other-
wise, there seems to be no reason except precedent for the Vir-
ginia Court to consider this one year extension in the case of
death as being limited solely to personal actions.
Montgomery Knight, Jr.
Is Va. Code §8-13 (1950).
sOIn Manuel Adm'r v. Norfolk and Western Ry., 99 Va. 188, 37 S.E. 957 (1901) the
plaintif was non-suited on his own motion, and brought a second action after the
twelve months had passed; it was held that Section 8-31 was not applicable.
'For examle, should a party die during or after the eleventh year of an adverse
claimants possession, the one year extension would in effect make the Virginia
statute of limitations sixteen rather than fifteen years. Whereas, if death were to
occur any time before the eleventh rear, Code Section 8.-31 would not be applicable.(An Illinois statute provides that if the person first entitled to bring a realaction
dies during the continuance of certain disabilities, then his heirs have an additional
two years in which to bring an acton. See Ill.Rev.Stat. §83-10 (1953).] The time
limit of five years was chosen to coincide with the present limit on personal actions.
